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TO THE EDITOR: Tan and Fitzgerald’s
template for emergency department
response to chemical–biological–radio-
logical hazards appears to be based on a
dubious assumption of a low level of
risk.1 A recent report details exposure of
emergency department staff to poten-
tially fatal secondary contamination
during a hazardous materials incident,
highlighting the need for staff to have
the appropriate training and equipment
to deal with these events.2
I believe the level of Personal Protec-
tive Equipment (PPE) proposed by Tan
and Fitzgerald is inadequate. The “face-
mask with filter” they describe is classi-
fied as Level C respiratory protection,
and this level only conforms to the
Australian Standard (for PPE) when the
identity of the chemical and its vapour
concentration are known, and when
these do not exceed the filtering capac-
ity of the particular filter mask being
used.3,4 In the initial confusion of a
hazardous materials incident, the iden-
tity of the chemical agent and its vapour
will not be known. There may even be
misinformation: during the 1995 Tokyo
sarin attack, for example, initial advice
to hospitals by the Tokyo fire service
was that the incident was “a gas explo-
sion in the Tokyo subway”.5
Emergency department staff must be
able to respond before the nature and
severity of the chemical hazard can be
determined. The only respiratory pro-
tection which conforms with the Aus-
tralian Standard for PPE when the
nature and severity of the chemical haz-
ard has not been determined is the
supplied gas respirator with full face
shield of Level A (an encapsulating suit
and self-contained breathing apparatus)
or Level B (a non-encapsulating suit
with self-contained breathing apparatus
or a full face respirator on a gas line).3,4
Confronted with a hazardous materials
emergency, potentially involving very
toxic chemicals, emergency department
staff need to have complete confidence in
their own protection. This is only possi-
ble with the use of supplied gas respira-
tors (Level A or B PPE), which provide
complete respiratory protection. An
additional problem with Level C air-
purifying respirators is that their per-
formance may be adversely affected by
water ingress into the filter, which could
occur during the decontamination pro-
cedures described in the template.
Tan and Fitzgerald also propose hav-
ing a clerk don PPE and enter the
contaminated zone. Any stationery
taken into a contaminated area would
have to be decontaminated before being
taken out to a “clean” area, and it is not
clear what a clerk would add to the
initial response within a contaminated
zone.
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IN REPLY: We thank Bradt for his inter-
est in our article and acknowledge his
expertise in this field, which he has
gathered in the United States and other
countries. We also thank Nocera for his
interest in our article.
Our aim was to stimulate interest
among the medical community in
chemical–biological–radiological (CBR)
response. The interdisciplinary issues
mentioned by Bradt were mentioned in
our article, but not in detail because of
space limitations.
Our personal protective equipment
(PPE) confor ms to  Austra l ian
standards1-3 and the three decontamina-
tion lines are in keeping with other
institutions. We are not aware of any
simple decontamination system which,
evidence-based, is superior.
The choice of PPE in the ideal situa-
tion would be one that would provide
adequate protection in all situations
with a minimal amount of training,
maintenance and expense. Nocera is
correct in stating that the respiratory
protection in an unidentified chemical
hazard is Level A or B. These PPEs are
expensive, bulky (which results in poor
manual dexterity), and their use
requires specialised training. The
amount of chemical present on a victim
surviving long enough to self-present to
an emergency department is signifi-
cantly less than that involved at the site
of the incident. Therefore, the level of
protection required for hospital staff
would be less than that required by
emergency rescue workers.
Our PPEs were supplied by the Victo-
rian health authorities. It is more impor-
tant for staff to be familiar with their
PPEs and for hospitals to have a CBR
response that is regularly practised than
having excessive protection that is lim-
ited to personnel who have undergone
specialised training.
The role of the clerk is to take patient
details. These are radioed to staff in the
hospital to help identify and correctly
label patients, which is very important
in mass casualty situations.
Recent experience has demonstrated
that terrorist acts are a worldwide phe-
nomenon, and Australians are potential
targets. This underlines the need for
comprehensive training and mainte-
nance of hospitals’ CBR response.
Since publication of the article, Victo-
rian health authorities have repriori-
tised, and we therefore feel we have
achieved the aims of our article.
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TO THE EDITOR: White emphasised
problems that can arise if medical deci-
sions are overly reliant on the results of
laboratory tests.1 He relates the case of a
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patient who, because of a peculiarity of
her immunology, consistently produced
a false-positive test result. In probabilis-
tic language, the issue is are there risks
of both random errors and patient-spe-
cific errors? It is important to distin-
guish between them. Suppose a test has
a false-positive rate of 10%. If this is
truly random error, the probability of
two false-positive results in the same
person is 1%, and the probability of
three false-positive results is tiny. But if
it is due to there being 10% of healthy
people for whom the test is invalid and
who consistently give a positive result,
the probability of two false-positive
results in the same person is 10%, and
the probability of three false-positive
results is 10%!
Major textbooks of medicine have
excellent chapters on decision-making.
These warn about limitations of sensi-
tivity and specificity (eg, that data from
the general population may not apply to
people who have tested positive in
screening). But, other than this, little is
said about reasons for errors in testing,
and the consequences for how sensitiv-
ity and specificity should be used. In
most cases, the impression given is that
errors occur completely randomly.
However, it appears that White’s exam-
ple, in which repeated testing led to
repeated errors, is not unique.
Lee2 writes as follows: “Suppose a
low-risk patient has an abnormal lung
ventilation–perfusion scan. Obtaining
that same test result over and over will
not truly raise that patient’s probability
of coronary disease further and further.”
Perhaps Goldman3 had something
similar in mind when writing, “It may
be quite difficult to distinguish random
laboratory errors from test results that
might be falsely positive or negative
because of coexistence of a process that
can affect the test”.
Lists of possible reasons4,5 for errors
include both short-acting (eg, distract-
ing external noise, and biochemical
effects of foods recently eaten) and
long-term (eg, physical handicaps, and
demographic factors) influences.
I wonder if information about tests
should routinely include separate ran-
dom and patient-specific components of
sensitivity and specificity. For example,
it might be stated that a false-positive
rate of 15% arises from 10% random
errors and 5% patient-specific factors,
or that a false-negative rate of 10%
arises from 3% random errors and 7%
patient-specific factors. This is the con-
clusion I have been led to by White’s
article.
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IN REPLY: Many factors potentially con-
tribute to error in generating a diagnos-
tic test result, and include random pre-
analytical errors arising from patient
preparation and specimen collection,
random errors associated with the act of
measurement, and systematic errors
caused by, for example, drug interfer-
ence. Tested individuals may also har-
bour an interfering substance, such as a
drug or immunoglobulin. The theoreti-
cal and practical description of these
components of test error is generally
well understood and documented by
laboratories, and the basics of test error
and diagnostic sensitivity and specificity
are taught in medical schools. However,
I think trying to apply probability data
to a test result for a specific patient is of
limited value to the treating doctor.
The commoditisation and automa-
tion of much of pathology testing con-
tributes to a perception that tests are
100% reliable, and there is also a per-
haps related decline in communication
between requester and provider. Most
tests have limitations, many inconse-
quential, some important and patient-
specific. Although Hutchinson draws a
valid conclusion, I hope readers also
concluded that communication with
diagnostic laboratories remains impor-
tant for safe patient care, and that test
results still need to be interpreted in the
context of other clinical information
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TO THE EDITOR: In reviewing the CD-
ROM containing an integrated set of
Therapeutic guidelines (eTG complete),1
Mann noted that, although utility was
improved, the cost was high ($220 for a
first user, and $110 for each subsequent
user, compared with $264 for a set of
the printed volumes which could be
shared within a practice).2
Unfortunately, the cost of distilling
evidence-based knowledge is also high,
especially for publications that require
regular review and update. In addition,
there are extra costs involved in elec-
tronic conversion (text to HTML),
reformatting material to fit computer
screens, creating expandable and col-
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